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I. INTRODUCTION
As the fifth largest economy in the world, California laws affect both the
natural and international economy.1 In California, and nationally, the legislative
branch enacts laws, the judicial branch of government interprets laws, and the
executive branch enforces laws. California’s Legislature is a full-time,
professional legislature with a nonpartisan staff of legislative drafters.
Statutory interpretation is, in essence, the method used by American judges
to ascertain what a statute means, to whom it applies, and how it interacts with
other statutes. The general rule of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the
legislature’s intent.
Yet, some legal scholars see the principles of statutory interpretation as

* Chris Micheli is a principal with the governmental affairs firm of Aprea & Micheli, Inc. in
Sacramento, California. He serves as an Adjunct Professor at McGeorge School of Law. The author wishes to
express his sincere thanks to his colleague, Jessica Gosney, for her generous feedback and assistance in
preparing this article. They jointly teach the Legislatures and Lawmaking course at McGeorge School of Law.
1. Bohn., et al., California’s Future: Economy, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. (Jan. 2020),
https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/californias-future-economy-january-2020.pdf.
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having no place in the legislative drafting process. 2 Others have argued
legislative intent is irrelevant because an interpreter’s job is to discern what a
statute means, not what the Legislature intended it to mean.3
Perhaps, though, that is the ultimate measure of success of legislative
drafting: a drafter’s job is to capture the legislator’s, or legislature’s, intent and
turn it into a statute with meaning. Using statutory interpretation principles when
drafting a bill enables a legislative lawyer to do that by adding clarity to statutes
and drafts in a predictable way.
By doing so, are legislative drafters drafting statutes with meaning or are the
courts interpreting statutes to further the legislative intent? We would argue both.
When drafters and the courts use the same tools, statutes have the potential to be
interpreted consistently, and that shared meaning is the ultimate goal.
This Article provides an overview of bill drafting in California, including key
statutory construction principles for purposes of bill and amendment drafting in
the state.
II. LEGISLATION IN CALIFORNIA
In California, when we use the term “legislation,” it does not just refer to
bills. Legislation also includes resolutions and constitutional amendments. While
only bills create statutes, the Legislature can adopt internal rules and express its
views by way of resolution and can place before the voters proposed amendments
to the state constitution.4
The following chart provides a brief comparison of the different forms of
legislation in the state:

2. See, e.g., David Marcello, Legislative Drafting: Teaching and Training Strategies in the U.S., 65 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 83, 97 (2017). But see William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1481 (1987); Chai R. Feldblum, The Joy of Teaching Legislation, 7 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
31, 35 (2003).
3. Oliver Homes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 417–19 (1899).
4. CAL. CONST., art. IV, § 8 (declaring that the “Legislature may make no law except by statute and may
enact no statute except by bill.”). The full rules of each house of the California Legislature, and their joint rules,
are passed each year as concurrent resolutions. See, e.g., H.R. 1, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); S.R. 4, 2018
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); S. Con. R. 21, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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Comparing Forms of California Legislation

Type of
Legislation
Bill

Passage
Required by
Assembly and
Senate
Assembly and
Senate

Presented to the Result
Governor
Yes
Statute

Concurrent
Resolution

Assembly and
Senate

No

House Resolution

Single house

No

Constitutional
Amendment

Assembly and
Senate

No

Joint Resolution

No

Expression of
intent to
Congress; not
law.
Internal
Legislative rules
binding on both
houses, or an
expression of
Legislative
intent; not law.
Internal
Legislative rules
binding on the
house that passed
it; not law.
Amendment to
Constitution, if
adopted by the
state’s voters.

Each of these types of legislation follows a specified format used by
attorneys in the Office of Legislative Counsel who are charged with drafting all
bills and amendments in the California Legislature. The following is the general
format followed for legislation:
Date introduced or amended
Number __ (AB, SB, ACA, SCA, AJR, SJR, ACR, SCR, HR, and SR)
Author(s) and co-author(s)
An act to __ (for bills to add, amend and/or repeal sections of law) or
Relative to __ (for resolutions)
Legislative Counsel’s Digest (existing law explained, followed by what the
measure would do)
Substantive provisions (including any intent language, or findings and
declarations)
The substantive provisions are made up of a series of sections. Each bill
section enacts new substantive law.
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When the Legislature passes a bill, and the Governor signs it or allows it to
become law without a signature, a statute is enacted. There are more than
150,000 statutes “on the books” in California. These “books” are called codes,
and there are twenty-nine codes arranged by subject ranging from the Business &
Professions Code to the Welfare & Institutions Code, with twenty-seven other
codes in between.
Just as a bill has a format or hierarchy, so does each code. Each code has its
own hierarchy of provisions and organization, but generally the format is:
Code
Title
Division
Part
Chapter
Article
Section
Each code section is additionally organized into various subdivisions:
Section __.
(a) Subdivision5
(1) Paragraph
(A) Subparagraph
(i) Clause
(I) Subclause
In California, attorneys in the Office of Legislative Counsel (also known as
the Legislative Counsel Bureau) (OLC) are required to draft legislation.
However, initial drafts can and often do come from committees, staff, lobbyists,
and other groups. The state Senate and Assembly share the nonpartisan OLC.
Comparatively, committees, staff, lobbyists, nonprofits, and the federal
Office of Legislative Counsel draft legislation in Congress. At the federal level, it
is optional to use the U.S. House and U.S. Senate Offices of Legislative Counsel.
Again, in California, use of the OLC is mandatory for final versions of bills and
amendments. In other words, bills cannot be introduced and amendments to bills
cannot be accepted unless they are in “Legislative Counsel form.”
There are obvious pros and cons of using attorneys for the legislative branch
of government to draft legislation instead of outside attorneys. For example,
having people with different goals or views of the statute can contribute to its
development, but ethical challenges may arise if a drafter has a personal position
on legislation.6 On the other hand, ordinary people may write in ordinary
language.
5. In United States federal law, this is called a “subsection,” but in California it is a “subdivision.”
6. See e.g., David Marcello, The Ethics and Politics of Legislative Drafting, 70 TULANE L. REV. 2437,
2440 (1996).
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III. USING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION PRINCIPLES TO DRAFT STATUTES IN
CALIFORNIA
This Part provides an overview of California statutory interpretation
principles as they relate to drafting statutes and provides additional drafting
principles used in the state. It is not our intent to dig into the judicial nuances of
statutory interpretation or to debate when or how a court should apply those
principles. Rather, this Part presents a practical take on some of the statutory
interpretation principles that can be useful when drafting or reading legislation
and statutes in California.
A. Statutory Interpretation Principles
The canons, or principles, of statutory interpretation are presumptions used
by American judges to assist them when interpreting statutes. Primarily, judges
use the canons to:
• Uncover the Legislature’s intent.
• Interpret the plain meaning of the statute.
• Resolve ambiguity within the statute.
While courts are not required to follow these rules of statutory construction
in every instance, they are intended to guide the courts in determining what the
Legislature’s intent was in enacting the particular statute. 7 Each state differs in
how it interprets statutes, but most follow the federal principles.
Kaufman & Broad Communities v. Performance Plastering is a critical
statutory interpretation case in California.8 The appellate court opinion
essentially: (a) clarifies that a determination of the existence of an ambiguity
occurs not at the time of a motion for judicial notice, but by the panel of judges
hearing the appeal; (b) lists cognizable and non-cognizable legislative history for
interpreting laws; and (c) acknowledges the propriety of taking judicial notice of
enrolled bill reports from a governor’s file.
In addition, the Kaufman case lists sources of legislative history that will be
considered by courts in California when trying to ascertain legislative intent. The
court sets forth the form by which it will consider “properly cognizable
legislative history”: A motion for judicial notice must be made “with the
understanding that the panel ultimately adjudicating the case may determine that
the subject statute is ambiguous”; the motion is to identify each separate
document for which judicial notice is sought as a separate exhibit; points and
authorities are to be submitted citing authority for each exhibit being “cognizable
legislative history.”

7. California Redevelopment Ass’n v. Matosantos, 267 P.3d 580, 606 (Cal. 2011).
8. Kaufman & Broad Cmtys. v. Performance Plastering, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 520, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
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1. Ordinary Meaning
This Section discusses the “ordinary meaning” rule.9 This rule typically
requires courts to give the statutory language its usual and ordinary meaning.10
Essentially, this canon means that we presume the Legislature uses words in their
ordinary sense. So, we ask, “What would these words convey to an ordinary or
reasonable reader?”
Of course, that also leads to a discussion of, “What is the ordinary meaning?”
For example, is it:
• colloquial meaning or conversational meaning;
• dictionary meaning;
• specific or technical meaning;
• prototypical meaning (i.e., the best example); or
• extensive meaning (i.e., all examples)?
As you might imagine, there are several challenges with the use of the
colloquial meaning. The first problem is, “From whose perspective do we view
this meaning?” A majority of judges on the courts are white men, and most
members of the California Legislature are also white men. But legislative
staffers, committee staff, and advocates proposing or drafting statutes are more
diverse. That context matters.
Judges are using dictionary definitions more frequently to determine ordinary
meaning. A commonly used dictionary, such as Webster’s, is often a good
starting place for a broad definition. Naturally, there are also challenges with
using dictionaries to determine a word’s plain meaning. Because there are
multiple dictionaries, each with slightly different word meanings, which one
should be relied on? Moreover, this assumes that bill drafters are using
dictionaries. Is this accurate? Are the same dictionaries even being used? And
dictionaries change over time. As a result, should a judge rely on a dictionary in
print when the law was written or a dictionary published today?
In addition, dictionaries often do not reflect different cultural meanings. They
do not provide context to interpreting the statute or provide guidance on what to
do if the statute contains words with a technical or specialized meaning that is not
reflected in a dictionary definition.
There are limits to a statute’s plain meaning. The presumption of ordinary

9. This is sometimes referred to as the “plain meaning”, “plain English”, and “literal meaning” rule. The
California courts, and federal courts, have long wrestled with where to start the statutory interpretation analysis:
legislative history or plain meaning. For an interesting discussion of the rise of plain meaning in the California
courts, we recommend Russel Holder, Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say: The Resurrection of Plain
Meaning in California Courts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 569, 572 (1997). For an interesting discussion on the
challenges with legislative drafting and the Plain English rule, see ROBERT J. MARTINEAU & ROBERT J.
MARTINEAU, JR., PLAIN ENGLISH FOR DRAFTING STATUTES AND RULES 3–11 (2012).
10. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Superior Court, 302 P.3d 1026, 1031 (Cal. 2013); Klein v. United States, 235
P.3d 42, 48 (Cal. 2010); Ailanto Props., Inc. v. City of Half Moon Bay, 48 Cal. Rptr. 4th 340, 348 (2006).
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meaning may be rebutted when a statute is directed at a specific technical
audience, such as doctors or lawyers.11 Additionally, the courts will not follow
plain meaning if that meaning leads to an absurd result. If a court looks at the
plain meaning and determines it would lead to an illogical result, the absurdity
doctrine requires the court to pick a meaning as close as possible to the literal
meaning. As former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia opined, you have
to pick the new meaning that “does the least violence to the text.” 12
2. Ambiguity
When ambiguity exists in the statutory language and courts cannot determine
the Legislature’s intent by the plain meaning of the statute’s words, courts will
use statutory interpretation canons to uncover the Legislature’s intent. 13 The most
common definition of “ambiguity” for statutory interpretation purposes is
anytime two or more reasonable minds may disagree on what the statutory
language says.14 In other words, there are two equally plausible interpretations of
the same language. California courts do not assign a percentage to this. Is it still
ambiguous if there is a 60/40 split? 90/10 split? 50/50 split?
When courts attempt to interpret a statute, they do so because there is
ambiguity in the statute, and this ambiguity creates interpretation problems for
how the law should be applied or interpreted. There are three categories of
interpretive problems: lexical, syntactic, and extra-linguistic.
The first, lexical, deals with what words mean, such as, “What is a
‘sandwich’?” Is the term “sandwich” defined in the law?
The second, syntactic, deals with the way words are combined or arranged,
such as, “The man hit the boy with the telescope.” Did the man hit a boy who
was holding a telescope? Or did the man use a telescope to hit a boy?
The third, extra-linguistic, deals with concerns specific to the law, such as
constitutional concerns.
Practically, there are several types of ambiguities found in statutes:
• It is unclear what a word modifies. For example, the modifier
follows a series of nouns so it is unclear if the word modifies all the
nouns.
• The word has more than one meaning.
• The statute, word, or phrase is fuzzy or vague. For example, there is
a broad meaning, or it could apply to a variety of things.
• The statute, word, or phrase is too general. For example, there are
nouns that apply to more than one thing.15

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See, e.g., Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306 (1893).
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529 (1989).
See, e.g., Heckart v. A-1 Self Storage, Inc.,415 P.3d 286, 291 (Cal. 2018).
See, e.g., People v. Dieck, 209 P.3d 623, 625 (Cal. 2009).
See also Robert J. Martineau & Robert J. Martineau, Jr., Plain English for Drafting Statutes and
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As you can imagine, sometimes generality or vagueness is intentional. A
common example is when the legislature delegates authority to a state agency,
and the drafter wants the power to be broad.16 Another example may be when the
statute recognizes there will be advancements or technological change
forthcoming, and so the law provides general, rather than specific, requirements.
3. Canons of Statutory Construction
For purposes of statutory construction, the courts and bill drafters use a series
of “canons” to guide them. These include textual canons (intrinsic aids),
linguistic presumptions and grammatical conventions, substantive canons, and
extrinsic aids.17 It is impossible to list them all, but this Section discusses the
most common canons and those most useful for legislative drafting.
We start with the presumption that the Legislature drafts its bills carefully
and intentionally.18 Because of this presumption, the usual approach of the
judicial branch is to narrow statutes rather than expand them, and the courts are
less activist in their interpretation.
Noscitur a Sociis guides us to interpret words or phrases in light of the other
words around it in the statute. 19 Namely, we should interpret an ambiguous word
or phrase by taking into account its use in its textual context. Some commentators
have opined that words are defined by the company they keep.
The following is an example: Each classroom shall be provided paper, binder
paper, printer paper, cardstock, and colored paper. In this case, what is the first
“paper” referring to? Under this canon, the first “paper” would be something
related to binder paper, printer paper, cardstock, and colored paper. This could be
writing paper but likely would not be receipt paper, which would have little use
in the classroom and would stand out given the context provided by the other
words in the sentence.
Ejusdem Generis guides us to interpret catch-all phrases as limited by the
specific words around them.20 Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
asked, “What category would come to a reasonable person’s mind?”21 His
opinion was that the canon narrows the statute, or the catch-all, by the
surrounding words.
Expressio Unius provides that a list of words with no catch-all means that the

Rules 97–100 (2012).
16. It is, however, a violation of the separation of powers doctrine in the California Constitution if the
Legislature delegates too much of its lawmaking authority. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Austin, 29 P. 1092, 1093
(Cal. 1892).
17. See, e.g., People v. Cornett, 274 P.3d 456, 458 (Cal. 2012).
18. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Nordstom, Inc., 393 P.3d 375, 383 (Cal. 2017).
19. See, e.g., People v. Prunty, 355 P.3d 480, 487 (Cal. 2015).
20. See, e.g., Cal. Cannabis Coal. v. City of Upland, 401 P.3d 49, 59 (Cal. 2017).
21. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 199–213 (2012).
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inclusion of specific words suggests the exclusion of other words.22
The Rule Against Surplusage explains that different words in the same
statute cannot have the same meaning.23 In other words, one word is not
duplicative or redundant of another word found in the statute.
The Whole Act Rule provides that statutory provisions should be interpreted
so they have a whole, coherent meaning.24 Identical words in the same or related
statutes should have the same meaning. The basis for this rule is that it assumes
the Legislature drafts purposefully and is consistent in its word use.
The Rule of the Last Antecedent provides that a modifier set off from a series
of antecedents by a comma should be interpreted to apply to all of the
antecedents.25 Put another way, any qualifying words are to be applied to the
words or phrases immediately preceding the qualifying word or words and are
not interpreted as extending to other words. Relatedly, the Serial Comma Rule
specifies that in a series of three items where each is set off by a comma, each
item should be viewed as independent of each other. Here is an example: My
favorite ice cream is coffee, mint chocolate chip, and vanilla with chocolate
sauce. Compare that sentence to the following: My favorite ice cream is coffee,
mint chocolate chip, and vanilla, with chocolate sauce.
In regards to interpreting general versus specific statutes, if a specific statute
is deemed inconsistent with a general statute that covers the same subject matter,
then the specific statute is usually deemed an exception to the rule provided by
the general statute.26 In addition, as a general rule of statutory construction,
courts must narrowly construe an exemption in a statute. 27
Similarly, a recently enacted statute is generally given more weight than an
earlier enacted statute. 28 In other words, if two statutes cannot be reconciled and
appear to be in conflict, the recently enacted statute will take precedence over the
earlier enacted statute. Statutes are presumed to operate prospectively, rather than
retroactively, unless there is evidence the Legislature intended the statute to be
applied retroactively.29
Finally, courts generally give deference to the interpretation of a statute
given by an administrative agency that has expertise and is charged with
interpreting and enforcing the statute. 30 While not necessarily a rule of statutory

22. See, e.g., Lopez v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 420 P.3d 767, 772 (Cal. 2018).
23. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc., 393 P.3d 375, 383 (Cal. 2017).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805); United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast
Iron & Steel Co. 416 P.3d 792, 796 (Cal. 2018).
25. See, e.g., Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 676, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
26. See, e.g., Lopez v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 420 P.3d 767, 771–72 (Cal. 2018).
27. See, e.g., Stoetzl v. State, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728, 736–37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
28. See, e.g., People v. Adelmann, 416 P.3d 786, 790 (Cal. 2018); Lopez v. Sony Elecs., Inc., 420 P.3d
767, 771–72 (Cal. 2018).
29. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 245 (1994); Quarry v. Doe I, 272 P.3d 977, 981
(Cal. 2012).
30. See, e.g., Heckart v. A-1 Self Storage, Inc., 415 P.3d 286, 299 (Cal. 2018).
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construction, it is important to take this point into consideration when there is an
agency determination regarding a statute’s meaning.
Substantive canons are presumptions judges have drawn from policy and
constitutional values. In general, these canons reflect normative beliefs of how
the law should be. There are essentially three types of substantive canons:
• tie-breaker canons;
• presumptions; and
• clear statement rules.
Tie-breaker canons are used when there is a 50/50 split on a statute’s
interpretation. An example is the Rule of Lenity, in which penal statutes whose
purpose is to punish must be construed strictly or narrowly.31 The purpose of this
narrow interpretation is to provide adequate notice, due process, and fairness. It
is usually not used in a way that decides the case: “all evidence is in the
defendant’s favor, plus the rule of lenity.”
Presumptions are the default interpretation principles that the court reads into
a statute. In these cases, the opposing party must rebut, or overcome, the
presumption. An example is the presumption the Legislature does not intend for
statutes to apply retroactively.32 As a result, a court will interpret a statute to
apply prospectively. Therefore, those arguing the statute applies retroactively
must provide legislative intent to overcome that presumption.
Clear statement rules are canons the U.S. Supreme Court developed as an
expression of “quasi-constitutional” values. For example, under the
Constitutional Avoidance Canon, statutes will be construed, if possible, to avoid
questions about their constitutionality. In such cases, the court does not have to
find that the statute is unconstitutional but only that it could raise a constitutional
issue.33
Extrinsic aids are conventions that use sources outside the legislative process,
including legislative history, stare decisis, or common law. The courts adhere to
the doctrine of stare decisis—a Latin term that essentially means a judicial
precedent should not be overruled by a later court absent some overriding
consideration. This is important so society knows how laws will be interpreted
and applied, and the doctrine creates consistency in court decisions.
4. Additional Principles of Statutory Construction
Many common words or phrases also present drafting challenges. For
example, the words “and” and “or” may be construed as interchangeable when

31. See, e.g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931); People v. White, 386 P.3d 1172, 1178
(Cal. 2017).
32. See, e.g., People v. Buycks, 422 P.3d 531, 541 (Cal. 2018).
33. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 336–37 (1936).
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necessary to effectuate legislative intent. 34 The word “and” can result in
ambiguity, such as whether the members of a group are to be considered
together. Here is an example: “Wild dogs and cats should be kept inside.” Does
this mean wild dogs and all cats? Or does it mean wild dogs and wild cats?
The word “or” can also lead to ambiguity. It is inclusive or exclusive? Here
is an example: “You shouldn’t run long distances if you are injured or out of
shape.” What if you are both injured and out of shape? Consider another
example: “Do you want the soup or the salad?” Does this mean that you may not
have both soup and salad?
Additionally, what is the proper use of singular versus plural forms of words?
An example of this by the U.S. House of Representatives OLC is “drivers may
not run a red light” versus “a driver may not run a red light.” In the first instance,
one interpretation is that a violation only occurs if multiple drivers run a red
light. That ambiguity is eliminated if the singular term is used instead of the
plural term.
Courts generally interpret the word “may” as being permissive, while the
word “shall” is mandatory.35 Federally, according to the U.S. House of
Representatives OLC, the term “shall” means that it specifies a required action,
while the term “may” means that a permissible action is specified, but it is not
required. On the other hand, “may not” is also mandatory and is often used for
denying a right or power.
There is also a difference between the terms “means” and “includes.”
According to the U.S. House of Representatives OLC, the term “means” is
exclusive, while the term “includes” is not. For example, if the statute says, “the
term . . . means . . .,” then it cannot include anything else. On the other hand, if
the statute says, “the term . . . includes . . .,” then it could include something else.
5. Legislative History
The primary purpose of statutory interpretation principles is to uncover the
legislature’s intent and the public policy behind the statute. 36 In other words, why
did the California Legislature do what it did? Legislative history can provide
critical insight into that intent.
Statutory history is usually defined as changes to the language of the bill
through the legislative process. Legislative history is usually defined as
statements of purpose or intent behind the bill. Most often, individuals will use
the phrase legislative history, but actually mean both statutory and legislative
34. See, e.g., In re C.H., 264 P.3d 357, 362 (Cal. 2011).
35. See, e.g., Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 (1984); Tarrant Bell
Prop., LLC v. Superior Court, 247 P.3d 542, 544 (Cal. 2011); see also ROBERT J. MARTINEAU & ROBERT J.
MARTINEAU, JR., PLAIN ENGLISH FOR DRAFTING STATUTES AND RULES 112–13 (2012).
36. For one of the most famous legislative intent cases, see Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.”).

467

2021 / Statutory Construction Guidelines for Bill Drafting in California
history.
Examples of legislative history:
• Committee reports.
• Statements of support or opposition from interested parties.
• Press releases, media articles, and interviews.
• Presidential signing or veto messages.
• Bill analyses by committees, sponsors or opposition, and advocacy
groups or lobbyists.
Examples of statutory history:
• Legislative intent statements in the act itself.
• Drafting history (i.e., was the statute amended prior to enactment).
For courts, who the speaker is matters for consideration of legislative history.
Was the speaker an interest group? A member of the legislature? A committee
member? In terms of the most persuasive legislative history, many courts and
legal commentators disagree. Courts consider the best legislative history to be
that which represents a large body of legislators, not just the bill’s author or one
side of the public policy debate. Generally, the following is a list in order of most
to least persuasive legislative materials:
• Conference committee reports.
• Committee reports.
• Statements made during debates.
• Statements from the sponsor of the bill.
Legislative history is challenging and, consequently, controversial. While a
statute is the law, legislative history is not. It also does not necessarily represent
everyone’s view because there is no collective intent; not all legislators may have
the same idea in mind when they pass a statute. 37 Also, we know that lobbyists
and advocacy groups influence a statute’s legislative history. To make matters
worse, the legislative history can easily be general, vague, or unclear.
Some legal commentators also believe the use of legislative history results in
judicial activism because some judges only use legislative history when a statute
is ambiguous after looking at its ordinary meaning. As a practical matter,
researching legislative history is expensive because parties to litigation will have
to dig through history instead of just applying common meaning to a statute.
B. Operation of Statutes in California
This Section presents several statutory rules on the operation of statutes in
California. The preliminary provisions of the different codes contain the general
37. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION
(2014).

AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 303, 314–18
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rules for the construction of statutes.38
A statute enacted at a regular session goes into effect on the following
January 1, which follows a 90-day period from the date of enactment of the
statute. On the other hand, a statute enacted at a special session goes into effect
on the 91st day after adjournment of the special session at which the bill was
passed. Statutes calling elections, statutes providing for tax levies or
appropriations for the usual current expenses of the state, and urgency statutes go
into effect immediately upon their enactment.39
When the provisions of one statute are carried into another statute under
circumstances in which they are required to be construed as restatements and
continuations and not as new enactments, any reference made by any statute,
charter, or ordinance to such provisions must, unless a contrary intent appears, be
deemed a reference to the restatements and continuations.40
When the same section or part of a statute is amended by two or more acts
enacted at the same session, any portion of an earlier one of those successive acts
that is omitted from a subsequent act is deemed to have been omitted
deliberately. Further, any portion of a statute omitted by an earlier act that is
restored in a subsequent act is deemed to have been restored deliberately.41
In the absence of any express provision to the contrary in the last statute
enacted, it is conclusively presumed that the statute enacted last is intended to
prevail over statutes enacted earlier at the same session. And in the absence of
any express provision to the contrary in the statute with a higher chapter number,
it is presumed that a statute with a higher chapter number was intended by the
Legislature to prevail over a statute enacted at the same session but has a lower
chapter number.42
Any statute may be repealed at any time, except when vested rights would be
impaired. Persons acting under any statute act in contemplation of this power of
repeal.43 No statute or part of a statute that has been repealed by another statute
can be revived by the repeal of the repealing statute. It can only be revived with
express words that revive the repealed statute or part of the repealed statute. If a
later enacted statute that deletes or extends the date of termination or repeal of a
previously enacted law is chaptered before the date of termination or repeal, the
terminated or repealed law is revived when the later enacted statute becomes
operative.44
Finally, neither house of the California Legislature may bind its own hands
38. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 9603 (West 2020).
39. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 9600 (West 2020). Federally, in Congress, the ordinary effective date is the day
the President signs the bill, unless the bill states otherwise. Among the states, the effective date doctrine varies.
In some jurisdictions, it is the date the governor signs the bill. In others, it is the following day.
40. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 9604 (West 2020).
41. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 9605 (West 2020).
42. Id.
43. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 9606 (West 2020).
44. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 9607 (West 2020).
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or those of future Legislatures by adopting rules not capable of change. “It is the
general rule that one legislative body cannot limit or restrict its own power or that
of subsequent Legislatures and that the act of one Legislature does not bind its
successors.”45
IV. TIPS AND BEST PRACTICES WHEN DRAFTING CALIFORNIA STATUTES
Each drafter follows their own unique drafting process, but most agree the
goal is to further the requestor’s intent. One of the first questions to ask is, “What
is the issue being addressed?” Other commentators sometimes frame it as, “What
is the problem to be solved?” Regardless of approach, the purpose of this
question is to set the stage for the bill drafter to understand what is desired to be
accomplished with the bill and the goal of the legislation.
Some other questions for the bill drafter to pose before commencing drafting
could include:
• To whom would the bill apply?
• Who is to be excluded?
• When does it take effect?
• Who is responsible for enforcement?
• What is the penalty for failure to comply?
• How does this law interact with existing law(s)?
• Do terms need to be defined?
• Are there existing definitions in current law? 46
It may also be necessary to conduct research on the public policy issues
being addressed by the legislation to better understand how to address the
author’s intent when you are drafting the legislation. After your research and
review of current law has concluded, it is time to write an initial draft of the bill.
We generally begin drafting by keeping at the forefront the desire to fulfill
the “plain meaning” rule. This means that the draft needs to use simplistic
language, and technical or legal jargon should be limited, except where
necessary. The language should be clear and brief and limit any unnecessary,
confusing, or redundant words. Also, think about when and where it is
appropriate to define terms used in your drafting. 47 While sometimes it is
necessary or desirable to be vague, we try to avoid it as much as possible.
In terms of preliminary drafting, one suggestion is to begin by deciding how
you would explain the proposed law to a friend using ordinary language.
Thereafter, look at how the other statutes in that chapter are drafted, or how other

45. In re Collie, 240 P.2d 275 (Cal. 1952).
46. See also ROBERT J. MARTINEAU & ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, JR., PLAIN ENGLISH FOR DRAFTING
STATUTES AND RULES 85–89 (2012).
47. For an interesting discussion on whether to define a term, see ROBERT J. MARTINEAU & ROBERT J.
MARTINEAU, JR., PLAIN ENGLISH FOR DRAFTING STATUTES AND RULES 119–20 (2012).
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states have drafted a similar statute. Are there terms defined for the entire chapter
or article? If so, consider using those terms.
Based upon where to place the bill language in existing law (i.e., which code
and which division or chapter within that code), determine how other statutes in
this area of the code read and how this language is to be integrated into the
existing statutory scheme. One example is whether you can use already defined
terms?
When you revisit your draft, try to poke holes in the language. Did you now
define or cross-reference terms? Are there any ambiguities in the language? Have
you taken into account the general rules of statutory construction a court will
utilize if it ultimately reviews the statute you drafted?
V. CONCLUSION
When drafting legislation in California, as well as other venues, it is valuable
to keep in mind the key statutory interpretation principles to create consistency in
the codes and to understand what the judicial branch will utilize when
interpreting the statute that is at issue in litigation. These principles and canons
will help guide the drafter to reduce ambiguity and better ensure the legislative
intent is achieved.
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